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Abstract. In the following paper we present a new semantics for the
well-known strategic logic atl. It is based on adding roles to concurrent
game structures, that is at every state, each agent belongs to exactly
one role, and the role specifies what actions are available to him at that
state. We show advantages of the new semantics, analyze model checking
complexity and prove equivalence between standard atl semantics and
our new approach.
1 Introduction
One of the most intensively studied [8,9,16] areas of research in the field of
multi-agent systems are strategic or cooperation logics – formalisms that allow
for reasoning about agents’ strategies and behavior in a multi-agent setting. Two
of the most known logics are Marc Pauly’s Coalition Logic (cl) [10,11] and Alur,
Henzinger and Kupferman’s Alternating-time Temporal Logic (atl) [5], which
can be considered a temporal extension of Coalition Logic. Both these logics
gained much popularity and generated a ‘zoo’ of derivatives [15,13,1,3,2].
This popularity is in no small part due to relative high expressive power of
both cl and atl, but also due to low complexity of model checking problems
for these respective logics. Model checking of Coalition Logic can be solved in
polynomial time in the size of the model and the length of the formula [10]. It
remains polynomial for atl as well [5], which is considered a very good result.
However, as investigated by Jamroga and Dix [7], in both cases the number
of agents must be fixed. If it is not then model checking of atl models repre-
sented as alternating transition systems is NP-complete, and if the models are
represented as concurrent game structures (cgs) it becomes ΣP2 -complete. Also,
van der Hoek, Lomuscio and Wooldridge show [14] that complexity of model
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checking for atl is sensitive to model representation. It is polynomial only if
an explicit enumeration of all components of the model is assumed. For models
represented in a (simplified) reactive modules language (rml) [4] complexity of
model checking for atl becomes as hard as the satisfiability problem for this
logic, namely EXPTIME [14].
We present an alternative semantics that interprets formulas of ordinary atl
over concurrent game structures with roles. As we describe in Section 2.1, such
structures introduce an extra element – a set R of roles. Agents belonging to
the same role are considered homogeneous in the sense that all consequences of
their actions are captured by considering only the number of votes an action
gets (one vote per agent). We give some examples that motivate our approach
and prove equivalence with atl based on concurrent game structures. We then
discuss model checking, showing it to be of polynomial complexity in the size of
models. This seems significant, since as long as the number of roles remain fixed,
the size of our models does not grow exponentially in the number of players.
The structure of our paper is as follows. We present a revised formalism for
atl in Section 2, prove equivalence with the standard one in Section 3, discuss
model checking results in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
2 Role-based semantics for ATL
The language of ordinary atl is the following, as presented in [5]:
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | 〈〈A〉〉 © φ | 〈〈A〉〉φ | 〈〈A〉〉φUφ
where p is propositional letter, and A is a coalition of agents. We follow standard
abbreviations (e.g. 〈〈 〉〉 for 〈〈∅〉〉) and skip connectives that are derivable.
2.1 Concurrent Game Structures with Roles
In this section we will introduce concurrent game structures with roles (rcgs)
and consider some examples. We will be using the notation [n] = {1, . . . , n},
and we will let AB denote the set of functions from B to A. We will often work
with tuples v = 〈v1, . . . , vn〉 and we will often view v as a function with domain
[n] and write v(i) for vi. We will do addition and subtraction on tuples of the
same arity component by component, e.g. for v = 〈v1, . . . , vn〉, v′ = 〈v′1, . . . , v′n〉,
v − v′ = 〈v1 − v′1, . . . , vn − v′n〉. Given a function f : A × B → C and a ∈ A,
we will use fa to denote the function B → C defined by fa(b) = f(a, b) for all
b ∈ B.
Definition 2.1. An rcgs is a tuple H = 〈A, R,R, Q,Π, pi,A, δ〉 where:
– A is a non-empty set of players. In this text we assume A = [n] for some
n ∈ N, and we will reserve n to mean the number of agents.
– Q is the non-empty set of states.
– R is a non-empty set of roles. In this text we assume R = [i] for some i ∈ N.
– R : Q×R→ ℘(A), such that for every q ∈ Q we have
• For all r, r′ ∈ R, if r 6= r′ then R(q, r) ∩R(q, r′) = ∅
• ⋃r∈RR(q, r) = A
For a coalition A ⊆ A we write Ar,q for the agents in A which belong to role
r at q, i.e. Ar,q = R(q, r) ∩A.
– Π is a set of propositional letters and pi : Q → ℘(Π) maps states to the
propositions true at that state.
– A : Q × R → N+ is the number of available actions in a given state for a
given role.
– For A = [n] = {1, . . . n}, we say that the set of complete votes for a role r in
a state q is Vr(q) = {vr,q ∈ [n][A(q,r)] |
∑
1≤a≤A(q,r) vr,q(a) = |R(q, r)|}, the
set of functions from the available actions to the number of agents performing
the action. The functions in this set account for the actions of all the agents.
The set of complete profiles at q is P (q) =
∏
r∈R Vr(q). For each q ∈ Q we
have a transition function at q, δq : P (q) → Q defining a partial function
δ : Q×⋃q∈Q P (q)→ Q such that for all q ∈ Q, P ∈ P (q), δ(q, P ) = δq(P )
To illustrate how rcgs differs from an ordinary concurrent game structure, we
provide some examples.
Example 2.1. We construct an example similar to the well-known train-controller
scenario [5], but in contrast to the original, in our scenario there are nt trains.
Consider a turn-based synchronous game structure with roles Strain = 〈A,
R,R, Q,Π, pi,A, δ〉 where:
– A = {1, . . . , nt, nt + 1}. There are nt trains and one controller.
– R = {train, ctr}. There are two roles: one for trains and one for the con-
troller.
– Q = {q0, q1, q2, q3}.
– R(qi, train) = [nt], and R(qi, ctr) = {nt + 1}, for all qi ∈ Q.
– Π = {out of gate, in gate, request, grant}
– pi(q0) = {out of gate}, pi(q1) = {out of gate, request},
pi(q2) = {out of gate, grant}, pi(q3) = {in gate}.
– A(q0, train) = 2, A(q0, ctr) = 1, A(q1, train) = 1, A(q1, ctr) = 3,
A(q2, train) = 2, A(q2, ctr) = 1, A(q3, train) = 1, A(q3, ctr) = 2.
– and finally
δ(q0, 〈(0, nt), 1〉) = δ(q1, 〈nt, (1, 0, 0)〉) = δ(q2, 〈(0, nt), 1〉)
= δ(q3, 〈(a, nt − a), 1〉) = q0 where 1 ≤ a ≤ nt
δ(q0, 〈(a, nt − a), 1〉) = δ(q1, 〈nt, ((0, 1, 0))〉) = q1 where 1 ≤ a ≤ nt
δ(q1, 〈nt, (0, 0, 1)〉) = δ(q2, 〈(a, nt − a), 1〉) = q2 where 2 ≤ a ≤ nt
δ(q2, 〈(1, nt − 1), 1〉) = δ(q3, 〈(0, nt), 1〉) = q3
Figure 1 presents the example in a visual way. The model can be seen as a
generalization of the classical train-controller example. In q0 we stay in q0 unless
at least one train issues a request. In q1 the controller behaves as before; it can
postpone making a decision (staying in q1), reject all requests (going to q0), or
accept the requests (going to q2). In q2 the trains can choose to enter the tunnel,
but only one of them may do so; if nobody attempts to enter the grant is revoked
(or relinquished), if more than one train attempts to enter we stay in q2, and
finally if (the trains reach an agreement and) only one train enters we go to q3. In
q3 any train may decide that the train in the tunnel has to leave (returning to q0),
and the train in the tunnel must comply. This reflects the homogeneity among
players in the trains role. The action of deciding to leave the tunnel is shared
among all trains, and the train actually in the tunnel remains unidentified.
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Fig. 1. Train controller model for nt trains (similar to the one presented in [5]).
Notice that in the single-train case (nt = 1), the train can not wait before
entering the tunnel after being granted permission (and retain the permission).
This could of course easily be avoided by adding another action. More impor-
tantly, in the case of several trains, the controller can not distinguish between
the different trains, so permission must be granted to all or none. This is a
consequence of the strict homogeneity in the model: not only are the agents
homogeneous in terms of the actions available to them, we can not reasonably
distinguish between them as long as they remain in the same role. Notice that
this feature allow us to add any number of trains to the scenario without in-
curring more than a linear increase in the size of the model (total number of
profiles). This would not be possible if we did not have roles. If the model above
was to be rendered as a concurrent game structure, the number of possible ways
in which trains could act would be exponential in all states where trains have to
make a choice of what action to perform. This would be the case even if, as in
the scenario above, almost all possible combinations of choices should be treated
in the same way by the system.
Sometimes homogeneity is desirable. In our trains and controller example,
for instance, homogeneity strongly encourages cooperation among trains; no one
can enter the gate unless everyone agree, and everyone knows that whoever gets
to enter must leave as soon as he is asked to. On the other hand, we notice that
it is impossible for any train to enter the gate unless all trains cooperate. This
might be overly restrictive. By adding more roles, however, we can amend this
while still retaining many of the benefits of using roles.
Example 2.2. In the previous example all trains were equal before the controller;
the controller could not distinguish between trains. We could grant the agents
much more individual identity by simply adding one more role, and in this
example we sketch the result of doing so. First we make nt “copies” of the
previous model sharing the state q0. In Figure 2 we illustrate the resulting model
for nt = 3. In q0 we let the trains vote for which train should be allowed to
request permission to enter the tunnel. We assume majority voting, but we do
not resolve ties. It means that if one train, x, gets more votes then all others we
go to ”his” state, q1x. Otherwise we just loop on q0. If we get to a q1-state, the
controller can grant or reject the request. Contrary to the previous example the
controller now knows which train is being proposed. If the controller grants the
request, the selected train is put in a privileged role and given the sole choice of
what to do with the permission.
The model has grown, so the trains gain autonomy at a cost. Still, this cost
is much less than the cost of modelling this scenario in a cgs. There, if each
train is to have the option to “vote” for any train in q0, each train must have
nt actions available. We would get n
nt
t edges leading out from q0! In the rcgs
model we get a substantially smaller degree, the following table summarizes the
difference (formulas for counting the degree are explained and discussed further
in section 4)
nt: 3 4 5 6 . . . n
cgs: 27 256 3125 46656 . . . nn
rcgs: 10 35 127 462 . . . (2n−1)!n!(n−1)!
Before we move on we introduce some more notation. Given a role r ∈ R,
a state q and a coalition A, the set of A-votes for r at q is Vr(q,A), defined as
follows:
Vr(q, A) =
v ∈ [|Ar,q|][A(q,r)]
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Fig. 2. The “autonomous trains” model for nt = 3. Numbers in red indicate member-
ship in roles: (1) = 〈A, ∅, {ctr}〉, (2) = 〈A\{a}, {a}, {ctr}〉, (3) = 〈A\{b}, {b}, {ctr}〉,
(4) = 〈A \ {c}, {c}, {ctr}〉. Also, each q1 state has a transition pointing at q0 labeled
〈3, 0, (1, 0, 0)〉 that was omitted from the picture for the sake of clarity.
The A-votes for r at q gives the possible ways agents in A that are in role r at q
can vote. Given a state q and a coalition A, we define the set of A-profiles at q:
P (q, A) = {〈v1, . . . , v|R|〉 | 1 ≤ i ≤ |R| : vi ∈ Vr(q, A)}
When we say that a function v : [A(q, r)]→ [n] is a complete vote (for r at q), we
mean that v ∈ Vr(q,A). For any v ∈ Vr(q, A) and w ∈ Vr(q,B) we write v ≤ w
iff for all i ∈ [A(q, r)] we have v(i) ≤ w(i). If v ≤ w, we say that w extends v.
If F = 〈v1, . . . , vR〉 ∈ P (q,A) and F ′ = 〈v′1, . . . , v′R〉 ∈ P (q,B) with vi ≤ v′i for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ |R|, we say that F ≤ F ′ and that F extends F ′.
An A profile F ∈ P (q, A) is a complete profile iff the sum of its components
equal |A|, i.e. F ∈ P (q) iff
(∑
r≤|R|
∑
a∈A(q,r) v(a)
)
= |A| iff A = A. Given a
(partial) profile F ′ at a state q we write ext(q, F ) for the set of all complete
profiles that extend F ′.
Given two states q, q′ ∈ Q, we say that q′ is a successor of q if there is
some F ∈ P (q) such that δ(q, F ) = q′. A computation is an infinite sequence
λ = q0q1 . . . of states such that for all positions i ≥ 0, qi+1 is a successor of qi. We
follow the standard abbreviations, hence q-computation denotes a computation
starting at q, and λ[i], λ[0, i] and λ[i,∞] denote the i-th state, the finite prefix
q0q1 . . . qi and the infinite suffix qiqi+1 . . . of λ for any computation λ and its
position i ≥ 0. An A-strategy for A ⊆ A is a function sA : Q →
⋃
q∈Q P (q, A)
such that sA(q) ∈ P (q,A) for all q ∈ Q. That is, sA maps states to A-profiles
at that state. The set of all A-strategies is denoted by strat(A). If s is an A-
strategy and we apply δq to s(q), we obtain a unique new state q
′ = δq(s(q)).
Iterating, we get the induced computation λs,q = q0q1 . . . such that q = q0 and
∀i ≥ 0 : δqi(s(qi)) = qi+1. Given two strategies s and s′, we say that s ≤ s′ iff
∀q ∈ Q : s(q) ≤ s′(q). Given an A-strategy sA and a state q we get an associated
set of computations out(sA, q). This is the set of all computations that can result
when at any state, the players in A are voting in the way specified by sA:
out(sA, q) = {λs,q | s is an A-strategy and s ≥ sA} It will also be useful to have
access to the set of states that can result in the next step when A ⊆ A follows
strategy sA at state q, succ(q, sA) = {q′ ∈ Q | ∃F ∈ ext(q, sA) : δ(q, F ) = q′}.
Clearly, q′ ∈ succ(q, sA) iff there is some λ ∈ out(q, sA) such that q′ = λ[0].
2.2 New Semantics for ATL
Definition 2.2. Given a rcgs S and a state q in S, we define the satisfaction
relation |= inductively:
S, q |=p iff p ∈ pi(q)
S, q |=¬φ iff not S, q |= φ
S, q |=φ ∧ φ′ iff S, q |= φ and S, q |= φ′
S, q |=〈〈A〉〉 © φ iff there is sA ∈ strat(A) such that
for all λ ∈ out(sA, q), we have S, λ[1] |= φ
S, q |=〈〈A〉〉φ iff there is sA ∈ strat(A) such that
for all λ ∈ out(sA, q) we have S, λ[i] |= φ for all i ≥ 0
S, q |=〈〈A〉〉φUφ′ iff there is sA ∈ strat(A) such that
for all λ ∈ out(sA, q) we have S, λ[i] |= φ′ and S, λ[j] |= φ
for some i ≥ 0 and for all 0 ≤ j < i
3 Equivalence between RCGS and CGS
In this section we show that definition 2.2 provides an equivalent semantics for
atl. We do this by first giving a surjective function f that takes an rcgs and
returns a cgs. Then we show that S and f(S) satisfy the same atl formulas.
Remember that a concurrent game structure is a tuple 〈A, Q,Π, pi, d, δ′〉
where every element is defined as for an rcgs except d : A × Q → N+ that
maps agents and states to actions available at that state, and δ′ that is a partial
function from states and action tuples to states defined by δ′(q, t) = δ′q(t) where
δ′q :
∏
a∈A[da(q)] → Q is a transition function at q based on tuples of actions
rather than profiles. The satisfaction relation for atl based on cgss can be de-
fined exactly as in definition 2.2, the difference concerning only what counts as
a strategy.
We refer to elements of
∏
a∈A[da(q)] as complete action tuples at q. A (memory-
less) strategy for a ∈ A in a cgs M is a function sa : Q→ N+ such that for all
q ∈ Q, sa(q) ∈ [da(q)] while a strategy for A ⊆ A is a list of strategies for all
agents in A, sA = 〈sa1 , sa2 , . . . , sa|A|〉, for A = {a1, a2, . . . , a|A|}. We denote the
set of strategies for A ⊆ A by strat(A). When needed to distinguish between
different structures we write strat(S,A) to indicate that we are talking about
the set of strategies for A in S.
We say that a complete action tuple at q, t = 〈ia1 , . . . , ian〉 extends a strategy
sA ∈ strat(A) if for all aj ∈ A we have iaj = saj (q). We denote the set of all
complete action tuples at q extending sA by ext(q, sA). For any state q ∈ Q we
have the set of all computations that comply with sA:
out(q, sA) ={λ = q0q1q2 . . .
| q = q0 and for all i ∈ N : ∃t ∈ ext(qi, sA), δ(q, t) = qi+1}
We define the set of sA-successors at q ∈ Q:
succ(q, sA) = {q′ ∈ Q | ∃t ∈ ext(q, sA), δ(q, t) = q′}
When we need to make clear which structure we are talking about, we write
succ(S, q, sA). Observe that q
′ ∈ succ(q, sA) iff q′ = λ[1] for some λ ∈ out(q, sA).
The translation function f from rcgs to cgs is defined as follows:
f〈A, R,R, Q,Π, pi,A, δ〉 = 〈A, Q,Π, pi, d, δ′〉
where:
da(q) = A(q, r) where a ∈ R(q, r)
δ′(q, α1, . . . , αn) = δ(q, v1, . . . , v|R|) where for each role r
vr = 〈|{i ∈ R(q, r) | αi = 1}|, . . . , |{i ∈ R(q, r) | αi = A(q, r)}|〉
We can see straight away that f is surjective because for any cgs S′ with n
agents we could define a rcgs S with that many roles where each role contains
exactly one agent. A vote for a role r, vr, at q would then simply be a da(q)-tuple
consisting of a single 1 (representing the agents chosen action) and otherwise
zeros. It is easy to verify that f(S) = S′.
Given either a cgs or an rcgs S, we define the set of sets of states that
a coalition A can enforce in the next state of the game:
force(S, q,A) = {succ(q, sA) | sA is a strategy for A in S}.
The first thing we do towards showing equivalence is to describe a surjective
function m : strat(f(S)) → strat(S) mapping action tuples and strategies of
f(S) to profiles and strategies of S respectively. For all A ⊆ A and any action
tuple for A at q, tq = 〈αa1 , αa2 , ..., αa|A|〉 with 1 ≤ αai ≤ dai(q) for all 1 ≤ i ≤
|A|, the A-profile m(tq) is defined in the following way:
m(tq) = 〈v(tq, 1), . . . , v(tq, |R|)〉 where for all 1 ≤ r ≤ |R| we have
v(tq, r) = 〈|{a ∈ Ar,q | αa = 1}|, . . . , |{a ∈ Ar,q | αa = A(q, r)}|〉
Thus the i-th component of v(tq, r) will be the number of agents from A in
role r at q that perform action i.
Given a strategy sA in f(S) we define the strategy m(sA) for S by taking
m(sA)(q) = m(sA(q)) for all q ∈ Q.
Surjectivity of m is helpful since it means that for every possible strategy that
exists in the rcgs S, there is a corresponding one in f(S). This in turn means
that when we quantify over strategies in one of S and f(S) we are implicitly also
quantifying over strategies in the other. Showing equivalence, then, can be done
by showing that these corresponding strategies have the same strength. Before
we proceed, we give a proof of surjectivity of m.
Lemma 3.1. For any rcgs S and any A ⊆ A, the function m : strat(f(S), A)→
strat(S,A) is surjective
Proof. Let pA be some strategy for A in S. We must show there is a strategy sA
in f(S) such that m(sA) = pA. For all q ∈ Q, we must define sA(q) appropriately.
Consider the profile pA(q) = 〈v1, . . . , v|R|〉 and note that by definition of a profile,
all vr for 1 ≤ r ≤ |R| are A-votes for r and that by definition of an A-vote, we
have
∑
1≤i≤A(q,r) vr(i) = |Ar,q|. Also, for all agents a, a′ ∈ Ar,q we know, by
definition of f , that da(q) = da′(q) = A(q, r).
From this it follows that there are functions α : A → N+ such that for all
a ∈ A, α(a) ∈ [da(q)] and |{a ∈ Ar,q | α(a) = i}| = vr(i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ A(q, r),
i.e.
vr = 〈|{a ∈ Ar,q|α(a) = 1}|, . . . , |{a ∈ Ar,q|α(a) = A(q, r)}|〉
We choose some such α and sA = 〈α(a1), . . . , α(a|A|)〉. Having defined sA in this
way, it is clear that m(sA) = pA.
Using the surjective function m we can prove the following lemma, showing
that the ”next time” strength of any coalition A is the same in S as it is in f(S).
Lemma 3.2. For any rcgs S, any state q ∈ Q and any coalition A ⊆ A, we
have force(S,A, q) = force(f(S), A, q)
Proof. By definition of force and lemma 3.1 it is sufficient to show that for all
sA ∈ strat(f(S), A), we have succ(S,m(sA), q) = succ(f(S), sA, q). We show
⊆ as follows: Assume that q′ ∈ force(S,m(sA), q). Then there is some com-
plete profile P = 〈v1, . . . , v|R|〉, extending m(sA)(q), such that δ(q, P ) = q′. Let
m(sA)(q) = 〈w1, . . . , w|R|〉 and form P ′ = 〈v′1, . . . , v′|R|〉 defined by v′i = vi − wi
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |R|. Then each v′i is an (A \ A)-vote for role i, meaning that
the sum of entries in the tuple v′i is |(A \ A)r,q|. This means that we can de-
fine a function α : A → N+ such that for all a ∈ A, α(a) ∈ [da(q)] and for
all a ∈ A, α(a) = sa(q) and for every r ∈ R and every a ∈ (A \ A), and
every 1 ≤ j ≤ A(q, r), |{a ∈ (A \ A)r,q | α(a) = j}| = v′r(j). Having de-
fined α like this it follows by definition of m that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ A(q, r),
|{a ∈ Ar,q | α(a) = j}| = wr(j). Then for all r ∈ R and all 1 ≤ j ≤ A(q, r)
we have |{a ∈ R(q, r) | α(a) = j}| = vr(j). By definition of f(S) it follows
that q′ = δ(q, P ) = δ′(q, α) so that q′ ∈ force(f(S), sA, q). We conclude that
force(S, f(sA), q) ⊆ force(f(S), sA, q). The direction ⊇ follows easily from the
definitions of m and f .
Given a structure S (with or without roles), and a formula φ, we define
true(S, φ) = {q ∈ Q | S, q |= φ}. Equivalence of models S and f(S) is now
demonstrated by showing that the equivalence in next time strength established
in lemma 3.2 suffices to conclude that true(S, φ) = true(f(S), φ) for all φ.
Theorem 3.1. For any rcgs S, any φ and any q ∈ Q, we have S, q |= φ iff
f(S), q |=CGS φ
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing that for all φ, we have true(S, φ) =
true(f(S), φ). We use induction on complexity of φ. The base case for atomic
formulas and the inductive steps for Boolean connectives are trivial, while the
case of 〈〈A〉〉 © φ is a straightforward application of lemma 3.2. For the cases
of 〈〈A〉〉φ and 〈〈A〉〉φUψ we rely on the following fixed point characterizations,
which are well-known to hold for atl, see for instance [6], and are also easily
verified against definition 2.2:
〈〈A〉〉φ↔ φ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉 © 〈〈A〉〉φ
〈〈A〉〉φ1Uφ2 ↔ φ2 ∨ (φ1 ∧ 〈〈A〉〉 © 〈〈A〉〉φ1Uφ2
(1)
We show the induction step for 〈〈A〉〉φ, taking as induction hypothesis true(S, φ) =
true(f(S), φ). The first equivalence above identifies Q′ = true(S, 〈〈A〉〉φ) as the
maximal subset of Q such that φ is true at every state in Q′ and such that A
can enforce a state in Q′ from every state in Q′, i.e. such that ∀q ∈ Q′ : ∃Q′′ ∈
force(q, A) : Q′′ ⊆ Q′. Notice that a unique such set always exists. This is
clear since the union of two sets satisfying the two requirements will itself sat-
isfy them (possibly the empty set). The first requirement, namely that φ is true
at all states in Q′, holds for S iff if holds for f(S) by induction hypothesis.
Lemma 3.2 states force(S, q,A) = force(f(S), q, A), and this implies that also
the second requirement holds in S iff it holds in f(S). From this we conclude
true(S, 〈〈A〉〉φ) = true(f(S), 〈〈A〉〉φ) as desired. The case for 〈〈A〉〉φUψ is sim-
ilar, using the second equivalence. uunionsq
4 Model checking and the size of models
We have already seen that using roles can lead to a dramatic decrease in the
size of atl-models. In this section we give a more formal account, first by inves-
tigating the size of models in terms of the number of roles, players and actions,
then by an analysis of model checking atl over concurrent game structures with
roles.
Given a set of numbers [a] and a number n, it is a well-known combinatorial
fact that the number of ways in which to choose n elements from [a], allowing
repetitions, is (n+(a−1))!n!(a−1)! . Furthermore, this number satisfies the following two
inequalities:4
(n+(a−1))!
n!(a−1)! ≤ an , (n+(a−1))!n!(a−1)! ≤ na (2)
These two inequalities provide us with an upper bound on the size of rcgs
models that makes it easy to compare their sizes to that of cgs models. Typically,
the size of concurrent game structures is dominated by the size of the domain of
the transition function. For an rcgs and a given state q ∈ Q this is the number
of complete profiles at q. To measure it, remember that every complete profile
is an |R|-tuple of votes vr, one for each role r ∈ R. It follows that |P (q)| is
the set of all possible combinations of votes for each role. Also remember that
a vote vr for r ∈ R is an A(q, r)-tuple such that the sum of entries is |R(q, r)|.
Equivalently, the vote vr can be seen as the number of ways in which we can
make |R(q, r)| choices, allowing repetitions, from a set of A(q, r) alternatives.
Looking at it this way, we obtain:
|P (q)| =
∏
r∈R
(|R(q, r)|+ (A(q, r)− 1))!
|R(q, r)|!(A(q, r)− 1))!
We sum over all q ∈ Q to obtain what we consider to be the size of an rcgs
S. In light of equation 2, it follows that the size of S is upper bounded by both
of the following expressions.
O(∑q∈Q∏r∈R |R(q, r)|A(q,r)) , O(∑q∈Q∏r∈R A(q, r)|R(q,r)|) (3)
We observe that growth in the size of models is polynomial in a = maxq∈Q,r∈RA(r, q)
if n = A and |R| is fixed, and polynomial in p = maxq∈Q,r∈R|R(q, r)| if a and
|R| are fixed. This identifies a significant potential advantage arising from intro-
ducing roles to the semantics of atl. The size of a cgsM , when measured in the
same way, replacing complete profiles at q by complete action tuples at q, grows
exponentially in the players whenever da(q) > 1 for each player a. We stress that
we are not just counting the number of transitions in our models differently. We
do have an additional parameter, the roles, but this is a genuinely new seman-
tic construct that gives rise to genuinely different semantic structures. We show
4 If this is not clear, remember that na and an are the number of functions [n][a] and
[a][n] respectively. It should not be hard to see that all ways in which to choose n
elements from a induce non-intersecting sets of functions of both types
that it is possible to use them to give the semantics of atl, but this does not
mean that there is not more to be said about them. Particularly crucial is the
question of model checking over rcgs models.
4.1 Model checking using roles
For strategic logics, checking satisfiability is usually non-tractable, and the ques-
tion of model checking is often crucial in assessing the usefulness of different
logics. For atl there is a well known “standard” algorithm, see e.g. [5]. It does
model checking in time linear in the length of the formula and the size of the
model. The algorithm is based on the fixed point equation 1 from the proof
of Theorem 3.1, so it will work also when model checking rcgs models. It is
not clear, however, how the high level description should be implemented and,
crucially, what the complexity will be in terms of the new parameters that arise.
Given a structure with roles, S, and a formula φ, the standard model checking
algorithm returns the set true(S, φ), proceeding as detailed in algorithms 1 and
2.
Algorithm 1 mcheck(S, φ)
if φ = p ∈ Π then
return pi(p)
if φ = ¬ψ then
return Q \mcheck(S, ψ)
if φ = ψ ∧ ψ′ then
return mcheck(S, ψ) ∩mcheck(S, ψ′)
if φ = 〈〈A〉〉 © ψ then
return {q | enforce(S, q,A,mcheck(S, ψ))}
if φ = 〈〈A〉〉ψ then
Q1 := Q, Q2 := mcheck(S, ψ)
while Q1 6⊆ Q2 do
Q1 := Q2, Q2 := {q ∈ Q | enforce(S,A, q,Q2)} ∩Q2
return Q1
if φ = 〈〈A〉〉ψUψ′ then
Q1 := ∅, Q2 = mcheck(S, ψ), Q3 = mcheck(S, ψ′)
while Q3 6⊆ Q1 do
Q1 := Q1 ∪Q3, Q3 := {q ∈ Q | enforce(S,A, q,Q1)} ∩Q2
return Q3
Given a structure S, a coalition A, a state q ∈ Q and a set of states Q′,
the method enforce answers true or false depending on whether or not A can
enforce Q′ from q. That is, it tells us if at q there is Q′′ ∈ force(q,A) such that
Q′′ ⊆ Q′. Given a fixed length formula and a fixed number of states, this step
dominates the running time of mcheck (algorithm 1). It is also the only part of
the standard algorithm that behaves in a different way after addition of roles to
the structures. It involves the following steps:5
Algorithm 2 enforce(S,A, q,Q′)
for F ∈ P (q,A) do
p = true
for F ′ ∈ ext(q, F ) do
if δ(q, F ′) 6∈ Q′ then
p = false
if p = true then
return true
return false
For all profiles F ∈ P (q, A) the algorithm runs through all complete profiles
F ′ ∈ P (q) that extend F . Over cgss, given a coalition A and two action tuples
t = 〈αa1 , αa2 , . . . , αa|A|〉, t′ = 〈α′a1 , α′a2 , . . . , α′a|A|〉 for A at q, the sets of complete
action tuples that extend t and t′ respectively do not intersect. It follows that
running through all such extensions for all possible action tuples for A at q is at
most linear in the total number of complete action tuples at q. This is no longer
the case for rcgs models. Given two profiles P, P ′ for A at q, there can be many
shared extensions. In fact, P and P ′ can share exponentially many in terms of
the number of players and actions available.6 So, in general, running enforce
requires us to make several passes through the set of all complete profiles, and the
complexity is no longer linear. Still, it is polynomial in the number of complete
profiles, since for any coalition A and state q we have |P (q, A)| ≤ |P (q)|, meaning
that the complexity of enforce is upper bounded by |P (q)|2. It follows that model
checking of atl over concurrent game structures with roles is polynomial in the
size of the model. We summarize this result.
Proposition 4.1. Given a cgs S and a formula φ, mcheck(S, φ) takes time
O(le2) where l is the length of φ and e = ∑
q∈Q
P (q) is the total number of tran-
sitions in S
Since model checking atl over cgss takes only linear time, O(le), adding
roles apparently makes model checking harder. On the other hand, the size of
5 In implementations one would seek to take advantage of information collected by
repeating calls to enforce and not just do a Boolean check for every new instance
in the way we do it here. This aspect is not crucial for our analysis, so we do not
address it further
6 To see this, consider P = 〈v1, v2 . . . , v|R|〉 and P ′ = 〈v′1, v′2, . . . , v′|R|〉. Each vr, v′r ∈
VA(q, r) sums to Σ1≤j≤A(q,r)vi(j) = |Aq,r|. Then form a complete profile P ′′ =
〈v′′1 , v′′2 , . . . , v′′|R|〉 at q such that for all 1 ≤ r ≤ |R| and all 1 ≤ j ≤ A(q, r) we
have v′′r (j) = max(vr(j), v
′
r(j)). Then, if it exists, choose a coalition A
′ such that
|A′r,q| = Σ1≤j≤A(q,r)v′′r (j). It is clear that the number of complete profiles that
extends both v and v′ is equal to the number of all A \A′-profiles at q.
cgs models can be bigger by an exponential factor, making model checking much
easier after adding roles. In light of the bounds we have on the size of models,
c.f. equation 3, we find that as long as the roles and the actions remain fixed,
complexity of model checking is only polynomial in the number of agents. This
is a potentially significant argument in favor of roles.
In practice, however, finding an optimal rcgs for a given cgs model M might
be at least as difficult as model checking on M directly. It involves identifying the
structure from f−(M) that has the minimum number of roles. In general, one
cannot expect this task to have sub-linear complexity in the size of M .7 Roles
should be used at the modelling stage, as they give the modeller an opportunity
for exploiting homogeneity in the system under consideration. We think that
it is reasonable to hypothesize that in practice, most large scale systems that
lends themselves well to modelling by atl do so precisely because they exhibit
significant homogeneity. If not, identifying an accurate atl model of the system,
and model checking it, seems unlikely to be tractable at all.
The question arises as to whether or not using an rcgs is always the best
choice, or if there are situations when the losses incurred in the complexity of
model checking outweigh the gains we make in terms of the size of models. A
general investigation of this in terms of how fixing or bounding the number of
roles affect membership in complexity classes is left for future work. Here, we
conclude with the following proposition which states that as long we use the
standard algorithm, model checking any cgs M can be done at least as quickly
by model checking an arbitrary S ∈ f−(M).
Proposition 4.2. Given any cgs-model M and any formula φ, let c(mcheck(M,φ))
denote the complexity of running mcheck(M,φ). We have, for all S ∈ f−(M),
that complexity of running mcheck(S, φ) is O(c(mcheck(M,φ))
Proof. It is clear that for any S ∈ f−(M), runningmcheck(S, φ) andmcheck(M,φ),
a difference in overall complexity can arise only from a difference in the com-
plexity of enforce. So we compare the complexity of enforce(S,A, q,Q′′) and
enforce(M,A, q,Q′′) for some arbitrary q ∈ Q, Q′′ ⊆ Q. The complexity in both
cases involves passing through all complete extensions of all strategies for A at
q. The sizes of these sets are can be compared as follows, the first inequality is
an instance of equation 2 and the equalities follow from definition of f and the
7 Although in many practical cases, when models are given in some compressed form,
the situation might be such that it is possible. The question of how to efficiently find
small rcgs-models will be investigated in future work.
fact that M = f(S).
∏
r∈R
(
(|Ar,q|+ (A(r, q)− 1))!
|Ar,q|!(A(r, q)− 1)!
)
×
∏
r∈R
(
((|R(r, q)| − |Ar,q|) + (A(r, q)− 1))!
(|R(r, q)| − |Ar,q|)!(A(r, q)− 1)!
)
≤
(∏
r∈R
A(r, q)|Ar,q| ×
∏
r∈R
A(r, q)|R(r,q)|−|Ar,q|
)
=
∏
r∈R
 ∏
a∈Ar,q
A(r, q)
×∏
r∈R
 ∏
a∈R(a,r)\Ar,q
A(r, q)

=
∏
a∈A
da(q)×
∏
a∈A\A
da(q)
 = ∏
a∈A
da(q)
We started with the number of profiles (transitions) we need to inspect when
running enforce on S at q, and ended with the number of action tuples (transi-
tions) we need to inspect when running enforce on M = f(S). Since we showed
the first to be smaller or equal to the latter and the execution of all other ele-
ments of mcheck are identical between S and M , the claim follows.
5 Conclusions, related and future work
In this paper we have described a new type of semantics for the strategic logic
atl. We have provided motivational examples and argued that although in prin-
ciple model checking atl interpreted over concurrent game structures with roles
is harder than the standard approach, it is still polynomial and generates ex-
ponentially smaller models. We believe this provides conclusive evidence that
concurrent game structures with roles are an interesting semantics for atl, and
should be investigated further.
Relating our work to ideas already present in the literature we find it some-
what similar to the concept of exploiting symmetry in model checking, as inves-
tigated by Sistla and Godefroid [12]. Our approach is however different, since we
we only look at agent symmetries in atl. When it comes to work related directly
to strategic logics, we find no similar ideas present, hence concluding that our
approach is indeed novel.
For future work we plan on investigating the homogeneous aspect of our
‘roles’ in more depth. We are currently working on a derivative of atl with
a different language that will fully exploit the role based semantics.
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